Simultaneous Effect on Debt and Managerial Ownership:  Agency Theory Framework by Akhbar, Taufik
Simultaneous Effect on Debt and Managerial Ownership: Agency Theory Framework  
(Taufik Akhbar) 
201 
Simultaneous Effect on Debt and Managerial Ownership:  
Agency Theory Framework  
 
Taufik Akhbar1 
1Department of Management 




This study aims to examine the debt policy and managerial ownership as tools to 
control the agency conflict. Debt policy and managerial ownership used in 
controlling agency conflicts have several considerations such as the risk of the 
company, the company's growth and the presence of institutional ownership in a 
company. The variables used in this study include earnings volatility as a measure 
of corporate risk, growth companies, managerial ownership, institutional 
ownership, debt policy, and total assets as a control. Furthermore, an analysis by 
means of regression models with simultaneous Two Stage Least Square method 
was used. The results found in this study stated that the risk factors, the growth of 
the company, as well as the existence of institutional ownership affect debt policy 
and managerial ownership control of the company within the framework of the 
agency conflict. This indicates that the use of policies to control the agency conflict 
must consider these three factors.  
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Agency conflict is important topic in financial management. The existence of 
agency conflicts is caused by the many interests that exist within the company. 
One of the causes of agency conflict is the use of corporate cash flow (free cash 
flow) that is used for purposes that do not generate added value for the company 
(Mao, 2003). In addition, Widiantoro (2008) stated that the agency conflicts also 
occur due to dissatisfaction of compensation system based on corporate earnings 
that are less able to accommodate the interests of all parties.  
Agency conflicts that occur within the company is also due to the separation 
of powers between the owner and the agent in the company (Dey, 2008). This 
separation gave rise to the asymmetry of information between the owner and the 
agent. This difference will result in managers to be motivated to take action or 
make decisions that less accommodate all interests by charging the cost of the 
company. As a result, the owner will bear all of the risks posed by the actions of 
the manager. Those risk that occurred because of manager action, make company 
have to make action to control the risk 
Agency conflicts also occur because of problems that exist in the structure 
of ownership in the company (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Jensen, Solberg, and 
Zorn, 1992; Brock, Martin, & Unlu, 2010). Managers as agents who run companies 
whose ownership is less than 100% then the potential for such conflicts will 
inevitably arise (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).Companies whose managers have 
100% ownership of the company as the individual companies will have zero 
agency costs, and there is no asymmetry of information between the owner and 
the agent.  
The presence of agency conflicts within the firm raises some costs to be 
incurred by companies such as monitoring costs, the cost of damages arising from 
the actions of managers in using the company's cash flow. Hanafi (2008) also 
stated that some cost that occur in controlling agency problem have a purpose for 
a preventive step to ensure managers have goals on behalf of the owner. 
Monitoring that be done by company can restrict the managers for some riskier 
action. So,the emergence of these costs makes companies to must take control of 
this agency conflict.  
Control of the agency conflict could be done by using two policy that is a 
policy of debt and increase managerial ownership. Debt policy of the company will 
limit the actions of managers in using the company's cash flow because of the 
responsibility for the payment relationship with the lender and the loan principal 
(Bathala, Moon, & Rao, 1994; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Mao, 2003). This 
responsibility forced managers to use their cash flow efficiently.Increasing 
managerial ownership in the company will reduce the agency conflict due to the 
allignment of interests between managers and owners (Bathala, Moon, & Rao, 
1994; Zhang, 2009). Managers who has owneship in their company logically 
become the owner too, so whatever decision that they made also affected to them. 
Control of agency conflicts also have to consider some things, especially 
related to the use of debt policy and managerial ownership. Policy loans that are 
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too high will cause a rise in the risk of the company. Such risks such as business 
risk, the risk of bankruptcy (Crutchley & Hansen, 1989). In addition to risk factors, 
the growth of the company is also an important factor in deciding the two policies. 
As in previous studies, this study also includes institutional ownership as an 
exogenous factor that will affect debt policy and managerial ownership in terms of 
controlling the agency conflict (Crutchley & Hansen, 1989; Bathala, Moon, & Rao, 
1994). Institutional ownership, debt policy and managerial ownership can be used 
as a control of agency conflict. The assumption of this study is that the debt policy 
and managerial ownership as an endogenous factor that can be controlled by 
managers and institutional ownership as exogenous factors that are beyond the 
control of managers (Bathala, Moon, & Rao, 1994). Therefore, this study wanted to 
test the effect of the risk, the growth of the company as well as the existence of 
institutional ownership on managerial ownership and debt policy within the 
framework of the agency conflict. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Agency Conflict 
Agency conflict is a financial term to refer to the conflict between the parties 
is in the company. Agency conflict can occur between the owner and the manager, 
shareholders with creditors, as well as the majority and minority shareholder 
(Brigham & Houston, 2007). The existence of agency conflicts occur for several 
reasons, such as dissatisfaction of compensation systems that are still considered 
traditional (Widiantoro, 2008), the separation of ownership between managers and 
owners (Dey, 2008), as well as the ownership structure of matter contained in the 
company (Jensen & Meckling , 1976, Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn 1992; Brock, 
Martin & Unlu, 2010; Vo & Nguyen, 2014).  
The form of the agency conflict commonly used are related to the use of 
corporate cash flow (Mann & Sicherman, 1991; Mao, 2003). Free cash flow agency 
is caused by managers action who used the company’s cash flow to take action for 
their interest. This action such as do some investment in high risk project, make 
owner or stockholder in high risk too. Agency of free cash flow also happened 
because managers as agents are not satisfied with the compensation system, as 
well as the separation of ownership are encouraged to make decisions or policies 
by using company resources such as cash flow, on investments that are less able 
to accommodate the interests of all stakeholders.  
The existence of agency conflicts lead to the costs to be incurred by the 
company. These costs include the cost of monitoring costs, bonding costs and 
residual loss. The emergence of these costs makes companies should control the 
agency conflict. In controlling the agency conflict, the company uses debt and 
managerial ownership (Crutchley & Hansen, 1989; Brigham & Houston, 2007). 
Debt can control the existence of a conflict because it limits the actions of 
managers in using the company's cash flow. Managerial ownership can be used to 
control the agency conflict between the interests of being able to bring together 
managers and owners. Managers who have ownership in their company also 
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become the owner, it makes managers become conservative to use cash flow 
especially for high risk project and more carefull to take some action. 
2.2 Debt Policy  
Within the framework of agency theory, debt has the benefit of controlling 
the actions of managers regarding the use of company cash flow. Debt managers 
can restrict the use of the company's cash flow, because there is an obligation that 
must be carried out on the creditor (Mao, 2003; Zhang, 2009). The existence of 
such obligations make the manager more conservative in using the company's 
cash flow, it would be wise in using it.  
In Modigliani and Miller theory (MM theory) stated that using debt has 
advantage. MM Theory compare that value of company with no debt is lower than 
the other company which use a debt. Company that has high level of debt can be 
used to tax shield, because interest is deductable for company’s income. Tax 
shield advantage of debt also can affect on value of the firm.  
As the trade off theory, debt policy within the framework of the agency 
conflict also has the advantage that as a tool to control agency conflicts, but 
weakneeses will also raise the cost and increasing the risk of corporate bankruptcy 
(Bathala, Moon, & Rao, 1994; Brigham & Ehrhardt, 2005). It means that debt that 
used by company has limited portion. If company reached optimum debt, they have 
to swtich to the other source of funding, because they still use debt it will increase 
risk and cost of capital for those company.It is proposed in Pecking Order theory 
that after debt has optimum capacity, switch source of funding into stock. This 
potential risk will be considered by the company to use debt as a means of 
controlling the agency conflict later.  
2.3 Ownership Structure  
Jensen & Meckling (1976) divides ownership in the company into two, 
namely managerial ownership and institutional ownership. The context of the 
agency theory of ownership structure can be used to control agency conflicts within 
the firm.  
Managerial ownership can be used to control the agency conflict because it 
can be used as a means of control for managers because it can make allignment 
between the goals of owner and manager (Bathala, Moon & Rao, 1994; Crutchley 
& Hansen, 1989). Allignment of purpose arises because the manager will also act 
as an owner who will consider the value of the company.  
Institutional ownership is also able to control agency conflict so that it can 
control the managers in making decisions (Bathala, Moon, & Rao, 1994, Crutchley 
& Hansen, 1989; Cofee 1991). Grinstein & Michaely (2005) explained that 
institutional ownership has the advantage of knowing the market conditions better 
than other investors, so the performance of better management can be assessed.  
2.4 Relationship of Debt Policy, Managerial Ownership and Agency 
Conflicts  
The existence of agency conflicts within the firm, forced the company to take 
steps to resolve the conflict. Efforts that can be done is to use debt policy and 
managerial ownership. Described earlier, the debt manager is able to restrict the 
use of corporate cash flow, making it more conservative to the risk incurred, 
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whereas a high managerial ownership is able to allign the interests between 
managers and owners so that potential conflicts will be reduced.  
Debt has a role as controlling conflict has special considerations, especially 
a risk (Bathala, Moon, & Rao, 1994; Brigham & Ehrhardt, 2005).  When company 
has higher level of debt it will make company face bankcruptcy risk and as an 
alternative to switch to another funding through equity. It means that existence of 
risk will have a negative effect on the debt, and positive managerial ownership in 
terms of controlling the agency conflict instead of debt roles. 
In addition to risk factors, the growth of the company will also form the 
consideration for the use of the two policies. Bathala, Moon, & Rao (1994) states, 
within the framework of agency conflict, growing companies tend not to use debt, 
and will move on to the stock. This is because the company has low asymmetry 
costs. Billett, King, and Mauer (2007) in the study expressed growing companies 
tend not to use debt as a conservative stance on the risks that arise in large 
investments. A previous study that described by Myers and Majluf (1984) also 
stated that the company has a growing tendency not to use debt and move on to 
the stock, as measures to avoid risks and oversight of rigorous external parties.  
The presence of institutional ownership in the company is also a 
consideration in the use of debt policy and managerial ownership. Bathala, Moon, 
& Rao (1994) explain that institutional ownership can reduce agency conflicts, but 
its presence will affect the proportion of debt and managerial ownership of the 
company. Institutional ownership also can take over a role of debt to control 
agency problem from external parties. If company has higher institutional 
ownership, it will control the manager to take corporate action in order to allign with 
their interest, including debt policy. 
3. FORMULATION OF HYPOTHESIS  
3.1 Business Risk, Growth, Institutional Ownership Against Debt Policy 
Debt policy has usefulness to reduce agency conflicts that occurred at the 
company. However, the use of debt also has some risks such as business risk, and 
the risk of bankruptcy (Bathala, Moon, & Rao, 1994). Risks arising will be 
measured by using earnings volatility as a measure of business risk and 
bankruptcy. The impact of such high risk, makes it better to reduce the level of debt 
that is used to control the agency conflict, and choose other sources of funding, 
namely through equity. Volatility of earning represent of agency because it can 
measure deviation of earning that happen within a company.Companies that are 
growing, will also tend not to use debt and will move on to the stock as well as 
measures to reduce the risk of reducing supervision by external parties ie creditors 
(Bathala, Moon, & Rao, 1994; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Therefore, the growth 
would have a negative impact on debt.  
The presence of institutional ownership will also affect debt policy. 
Institutional ownership is said to be able to reduce the agency conflict because it 
can limit the manager. However, its presence will affect the proportion of debt, 
because companies no longer need to use debt to overcome agency conflicts. 
Institutional ownership acan reduce the debt in term when company used to much 
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debt, they will take a control especially for a manager to not used higher debt 
because some risk consideration. (Bathala, Moon, & Rao, 1994).  
Hyphotesis Ia :  Business risk has negative impact to debt policy 
Hypothesis Ib :  Company’s growth has negative impact to debt policy 
Hypothesis Ic :  Institutional ownership has negative impact to debt policy 
3.2 Business Risk, Growth, Institutional Ownership Against Managerial 
Ownership  
Rising corporate risk posed by the use of high debt to control agency 
conflicts make the company would turn to other funding sources, and one of them 
is through equity (Crutchley & Hansen, 1989). So in controlling agency conflicts, 
high risk will make managerial ownership increase because of the opportunity to 
buy shares of the company. In agency problem framework, managerial ownership 
can allign interest between owner and manager. Managerial ownership can restrict 
a manager to do some high risk project and become more careful to use 
company’s resources. 
The growth of the company will also have a positive impact on managerial 
ownership. Companies that are growing have the flexibility to use alternative 
sources of funding to finance its growth. Within the framework of the agency 
conflict, companies tend to use stock to avoid agency costs (Bathala, Moon, & 
Rao, 1994). Titman and Wessels (1988) also describes the trade off on the pecking 
order theory in which the company should better use of debt. However, within the 
framework of the conflict, using debt will make the cost greater.These costs such 
as bankruptcy costs, supervision of conflict costs, as well as the cost of capital. 
Therefore, they will choose to use equity.The presence of institutional ownership 
would have a negative effect on managerial ownership. This is due to institutional 
ownership as an exogenous factor and cannot be controlled by the manager. In the 
role of controlling agency proeblem, company that has higher the institutional 
ownership will has the smaller the managerial ownership. External control will take 
over to control manager in order to they work properly on behalf of the owner and 
avioding some harmful action. Since instituitonal cannot be controlled by manager, 
it more effective to reduce agency problem and can forced managers to make 
policy not only for their interest but to all stakeholder. 
Hyphotesis IIa : Business Risk has positive impact to managerial ownership 
Hyphotesis IIb : Company growth has positive impact to managerial ownership 




4.1 Population and Sample 
 Population of this research is manufacturig company listed in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange between 2009-2012. Sampling technique using purposive 
sampling with some criteria such as company must be listed and not delisting, 
company have proper financial statement especially has institutional ownership, 
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managerial ownership. From criteria resulted 47 samples a years, then pooled in 4 
years. 
4.2 Variables and Measurement 
 Researcher want to test simultaenous effect between debt and managerial 
owership. There two equation that shown below ( Bathara, Moon, and Rao, 1994) 
DRit    =    β0  +   β1(RISKit)   +   β2(GRWTit)   +   β3(INSTOWNit)   +   β4(MNOWNit)   
+ εit  ..................................................................... (1) 
 
MNOWNit    =    β0  +   β1(RISKit)   +   β2(GRWTit)   +  β3(INSTOWNit)   +   β4(TAt)   +  
β5(DRit)   + εit  ................................................................. (2) 
Dependent variables are managerial ownership and debt. Managerial 
ownership measured by average managerial ownership over 4 years (Bathala, 
Moon and Rao, 1994). Debt measured by average long-term debt over 4 years. 
Debt and managerial ownership have some role as mechanism control to reduce 
agency problem and they have simultaneous relationship (Bathala, Moon & Rao, 
1994; Crutchley & Hansen, 1989) 
Independen variables are business risk (RISK). Business risk proxy is 
earning volatility measured by standar deviation of operating income divided by 
total asset over 4 years. Company growth (GROWTH) as a proxy of growth 
measured by growth of total asset for 4 years. Then, institutional ownership 
(INSTOWN) measured by institutional ownership of company. Then total asset as 
control variable (TA) measured by log total asset of company in each years. Total 
asset (TA) as control variable. Bathala, Moon and Rao (1994) stated that 
managerial ownership in smaller firm is more greater than larger firm. It means that 
proportion of share that managerial limited because diversification problems 
esecially for larger company 
 
5. RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
5.1 Findings 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistic 
Remark DR EVOL GROWTH INSTOWN    SIZE MNOWN 
 Mean 0,128581 0,042508 0,087311 0,248628 2.390.773 0,047017 
 Maximum 0,544250 0,212170 0,506288 0,810300 41.509.324 0,272600 
 Minimum 0,000000 0,042730 -0,263609 0,030500 10.583 0,000250 
 Std. Dev. 0,110199 0,041730 0,075118 0,199977 6.571.976 0,062089 
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From table 1, describes the data used in this research. Descriptive statistics 
were obtained by using E-Views on 6 variables: EVOL, MNOWN, INSTOWN, 
LOGSIZE, GROWTH and DR to obtain data on the average, maximum value, 
minimum value, median and standard deviation.  
Classical assumption made in this study include normality, 
heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and multicollinearity tests. Based on the 
calculation that the study, data are free from both the classical assumption of 




Table 2. First Hypothesis Testing Results 
DR = β0 + β1EVOL + β2GROWTH+ β3INSTOWN+ β4MNOWN + e 
Variable Coefficient t value Prob. 
EVOL -0,293 -2,61 0,04** 
GROWTH -0,011 -2,21 0,035** 
INSTOWN -0,018 -1,96 0,015** 
MNOWN -0,259 -2,83 0,0058** 
 
F = 4,25,prob = 
0,014   
 Adj R2 = 26,91%   
 
In Table 2, the first hypothesis shows that EVOL, GROWTH, INSTOWN, and 
MNOWN have significant value. This is supported by probability values of the 
variables that are under the value of α = 5%. Simultaneously, F value is also of 
significant value with a probability below the value of α = 5% with a coefficient of 
determination equal to 26.91% 
 
Table 3. Second Hypothesis Testing Results 
MNOWN = β0 + β1EVOL + β2GROWTH+ β3INSTOWN+ β4LOGSIZE+ β5DR + e 
Variable Coefficient t value Probabilities 
EVOL 0,146 2,54 0,004** 
GROWTH 0,013 2,46 0,002** 
INSTOWN -0,024 -2,65 0,039** 
LOGSIZE -0,011 -3,68 0,0215** 
DR -0,065 -0,83 0,158 
 F stat = 3,80 (0,005)   
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In Table 3, the second hypothesis shows that EVOL, GROWTH, INSTOWN, 
and LOGSIZE have significant value with a probability value below the value of α = 
5%. Only, DR was not significant because the probability is above the value of α = 
5%. Simultaneously, F value is significant with a probability below the value of α = 
5% with a 22.11% coefficient of determination. 
5.2 Discussion  
The first hypothesis showed that all variables are significant in affecting debt 
policy. The first variable is the business risk has a negative and significant 
coefficient. These results are consistent with previous studies that the potential risk 
of causing companies tends to reduce their debts (Crutchley & Hansen, 1989; 
Bathala, Moon & Rao, 1994). The risk makes managers more conservative with 
corporate cash and restrict to use debt. Research from Gabriel and Barker (1980) 
stated that business risk has an impact in company’s cash flow. It means that 
higher business risk in a company make uncertainty of cash flow. Company that 
has higher debt must have enough cash reserve to pay interest. When, company 
faced by higher business risk and higher debt, so it will be increasing bankruptcy 
because company does not have much reserve to fullfil their obligation.  
Then the growth of the company has a negative and significant coefficient. 
This is in line with research conducted by Bathala, Moon & Rao (1994) which 
describes the framework of the agency conflict of emerging companies tend not to 
use debt and will switch to source funding through stock. Bathala, Moon, & Rao 
(1994) describe that growth company has low asymmetric information, so it 
possible to access external financing. Since debt has high risk, so company will 
switch their financing to stock. It finding  also supported by research conducted by 
Billett, King, and Mauer (2007) which stated that the company would avoid using 
debt as a conservative measures for risks that may arise from investment activities. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) also explain that companies tend not to use any debts 
that are too large and opted to use equity to avoid the scrutiny of rigorous external 
parties.  
The presence of institutional ownership also has a negative and significant 
impact on debt policy. Companies that have large institutional holdings tend not to 
use a large debt, because the control of the external (institutional) can be used to 
control the manager in running their duties (Bathala, Moon & Rao, 1994). 
Moreover, it is said that the risks of using stock is rated lower than debt when 
companies have a difficult time. The risk in question is the obligation to do the 
company to external parties, especially creditors who have the right to conduct the 
liquidation of the company in the event of default.  
Managerial ownership has a negative and significant impact on debt policy. 
Managerial ownership as control over the use of debt is done by the company as 
the company steps to reduce the risks posed by the use of the debt. In the context 
of agency conflict, control by the use of debt as managerial managers measures to 
reduce the risks of investing in the company because of the increase in risk due to 
the use of debt companies. If the company is default and bankrupt, the 
shareholders of either managerial or institution will accept the losses, since 
shareholders are the party that received the last claim to damages. Therefore, 
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control of managerial ownership will restrict the use of debt companies. Research 
from Datta, et al (2005) also stated that manager has freedom to choice level of 
leverage that company used even the maturity of those debt. Based on this 
statement, if company use debt as financing source, it will isolate the manager 
from external monitoring. Managers will have some restriction considering about 
their choice to use debt. This restriction is about the maturity of debt that can be 
used to. Company that has higher managerial ownership will decrease using debt 
that has high maturity because some risk consideration and vice versa. 
In the second hypothesis, the results obtained are business risk, growth, 
institutional ownership and total assets have a significant effect on managerial 
ownership. Unlike the debt policy, as a control variable has a value that is not 
significant. Business risk (RISK) has a significant positive influence on managerial 
ownership. In line with research conducted by Crutchley and Hansen (1989) that 
the increase in risk resulting from the use of debt, making companies reluctant to 
use debt and equity to the switch. In control agency conflicts, this condition will be 
an opportunity for managers to be able to buy shares and increase the proportion 
of ownership. Other benefits gained by the increase in managerial ownership are 
the pooling of interests between managers and owners so that managers will 
perform their duties properly.  
The growth of the company also has a significant positive effect on 
managerial ownership. This is due to the flexibility that is owned by a company that 
is growing to use funding sources. In the context of agency problems, this finding is 
in line with research by Bathala, Moon, & Rao (1994) and Titman and Wessels 
(1988) that the company will use the equity to avoid the costs that arise when the 
use of debt such as bankruptcy costs, monitoring costs and the costs of leveraging 
capital. Company that has growth stage also has lower asymmetric information. It 
can encourage company to use stock for avoiding debt. This finding also makes 
aligned with the capital structure of the Pecking Order theory that states the 
company should use the debt to finance growth, and if debt has optimal capacity, it 
better to switch the financing source to stock. If company forced to use debt, it will 
increase bankcruptcy cost and investor would make required rate of return more 
higher too. 
Institutional ownership has a negative and significant relationship in 
managerial ownership. In line with the findings of Bathala, Moon & Rao (1994) that 
institutional ownership as an exogenous factor has a function as a control 
manager. Supervision of the institution will make managers more cautious. The 
rise in the proportion of institutional ownership makes managerial ownership 
decrease because the control function is already outside namely the institution. 
The research from Dharwadkar,et al.(2008) also stated about effectiveness of 
institutional ownership has contradict impact with firm-level especially in 
managerial ownership. It is because high level of institutional ownership has impact 
in lower managerial ownership. After control of agency problem is took over by 
institutional level, company doesn’t need to pay higher compensation to manager 
to make alligned of interest. Directly, the manager action will be controlled by 
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institutional level. If manager take some action that has high risk for company, 
obviously institutional will increase their control.  
Finally, the total assets as a control variable has a negative value but significant. 
This is due to the sample company is a company that has great assets. Bathala, 
Moon & Rao (1994) said that the company that has a great asset tend to have a 
smaller managerial ownership than companies with smaller assets. In addition to 
total assets, the ratio of debt has a significant impact on managerial ownership. 
Research conducted by Jensen (1986) states that the level of managerial 
ownership in the company number is not influenced by the large proportion of debt 
in the company. The opposite, in fact the manager has the authority to use debt, 
and this is in line with the findings in the first hypothesis that managerial ownership 
has a significant impact on debt policy. 
6. CONCLUSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATION 
From the finding, this paper has been concluded that there is a significant 
effect on business risk (RISK), growth (GROWTH), institutional ownership 
(INSTOWN) and managerial ownership (MNOWN) as a control variable to the 
corporate debt policy in controlling agency conflicts. As stated before that when 
company using some high debt as source of financing, it will be increase risk, that 
company in growth stage will reduce of the debt for some risk consideration. In 
agency perspective, institutional ownership and managerial ownership take a 
control to reduce the risk, so they have negative effect for debt. In the second 
hyphotesis there is a significant effect on business risk (RISK), growth (GROWTH), 
institutional ownership (INSTOWN), as well as total assets (LOGSIZE). Different 
things happened on debt ratio (DR) that did not significantly influence managerial 
ownership in a company within the framework of the agency conflict. When 
company has high risk from using a debt, like in first hypothesis, it will increase a 
managerial ownership as a control mechanism to reduce agency problem, and 
managerial ownership can alligned interest between manager and owner. When 
managerial ownership used as control mechanism of agency problem, it will 
instead the role of institutional ownership, so for that reason institutional ownership 
has negative effect vice versa. 
This research has managerial implication regarding for capital structure that 
company used. Since managerial ownership has significant effect to debt, it means 
that when company has high managerial ownership, proportion of the debt will be 
reduced because of some risk consideration. Especially when company in a growth 
stage so it needs more external financing, company will use debt, but from internal 
parties will take some control for proportion of the debt to anticipate the risk. When 
company has high proportion of the debt, control of the company will be more 
intensive even not only from internal parties, but from external parties such as from 
institutional ownership. Simultaneous effect that proposed in this research shown if 
company has high risk as the impact of using debt, it not only increase of 
managerial ownership as a control from internal parties to reduce agency cost but 
also institutional ownership as external control for company. 
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